The benefits of immigration are concentrated among the few while the costs are spread across the many. Consequently, beneficiaries lobby hard for larger intakes while the majority, though disaffected, fail to push for lower ones. Thus the 'normal' politics of immigration are client-based and expansionary. But current immigration to the United States is now both large and concentrated; it has also been accompanied by a number of crises. These factors have led to moves for reform; though some reforms may be introduced, they are unlikely to produce dramatic cuts. Afterwards, immigration politics will return to 'normal'.

Immigration has become a fractious issue in the United States. Longstanding public interest in stanching the flow of illegal immigrants has been joined to serious discussion of reforming and scaling back legal immigration as well. If, as seems likely, some package of reforms is adopted this year, it will be the first time since 1924 that Congress has voted to reduce the annual intake of legal migrants.¹ Worried commentators and editorialists warn that 'anti-immigration hysteria' threatens to reverse the country's open immigration tradition. Legislative proposals before Congress are, to be sure, restrictionist in tone and content. Nevertheless, the most frenzied arguments, on both sides of the issue, are at this point simply alarmist rhetoric. The Congressional process is not over and some of the most hard-hitting proposals will never see the light of day. Even if fully implemented, moreover, the restrictionist agenda would reassert rather than reverse American immigration tradition.

Many protagonists in the battle over immigration reform seem not to realize that current immigration policy is unusual within the broader context of American history. In the last thirty years, but especially since the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, policy has been on a course of relentless liberalization. The primary purpose of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act was to reduce illegal immigration through sanctions against unauthorized work and it was, therefore, ostensibly a deviation from the expansionist path. The law's most salient feature turned out to be a mass amnesty that is not yet completed.² Having failed to deal effectively with undocumented entries, in 1990 Congress pressed ahead to expand legal immigration by one-third. These and other developments (such as expansionist court decisions) have given the United States the most liberal immigration policy in the world. Except for the period before 1924, when there were no systematic controls at all, American policy has never been more receptive. The feckless manner in which present law is typically implemented means that de facto policy is more generous still than the formal texts imply.

How did this vast expansion of immigration policy come about? Why have efforts to establish a modicum of control over illegal migration and the asylum process been so contentious? Why do suggested modifications of the legal immigration program meet such fierce resistance? What accounts for the recent flurry of reform proposals and the intensification of concern about immigration? Are fundamental alterations of American law likely? Do recent events represent a permanent shift or is a reversion to an earlier pattern of incremental expansionism ahead?

THE NORMAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION

Although it is not typical of U.S. history, a mode of expansionist immigration politics has developed in the last 30 to 40 years that has come to be considered normal. The principal riddle of immigration politics is precisely how this expansionary trajectory has been sustained in spite of the steadfast opposition of a majority of the American people.³

The undeniable hardening of attitudes about immigration in recent years has been seen by some observers as a reversal of a more general pattern of public support for liberal immigration policy. No such support ever existed. The Gallup and other polling organizations have, since the mid-sixties, asked Americans if immigration should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased. Those in favor of decreasing immigration levels have always outnumbered those wanting them increased. A remarkably consistent seven per cent favored increasing the intake in polls between 1965 and 1993, but the proportion proposing decreases has doubled from 33 per cent in 1965 to 61 per cent in 1993.⁴

Despite the solidity of popular opposition, immigration has rarely become as much as a peripheral issue in national political campaigns, even as governments have adopted one expansionist measure after another. Given the insignificance of elections in the formulation of immigration policy, to understand the puzzling gap between opinion polls and policy developments one must examine the way public officials, especially members of Congress, interact with organized groups between elections.

In the group politics of immigration, those who favor expansion enjoy substantial advantages. Immigration normally produces diffuse costs and concentrated benefits.⁵ The relatively small number of persons who stand to benefit directly and concretely from immigration have strong incentives to organize to secure those benefits. Those who bear the costs are less inclined or able to do so. Costs tend to be spread across the population as a whole - environmental degradation because of population growth, for example - or to fall disproportionately on those with insufficient resources to defend themselves - unskilled native Black workers, for instance. Immigration regulation is a public good. Like most public goods it has no well-organized constituency to demand it. The concentrated benefits and diffuse costs of immigration produce a form of client-group politics in which policy is made within a relatively tightly-knit subsystem composed of private interests who enjoy a virtual monopoly of access to policymakers. Policy is created without benefit of serious public scrutiny and largely unconstrained by the wishes of an unsympathetic but poorly mobilized public.

Politicians heed the demands of organized proponents of immigration and ignore the general public because it is in their interest to do so. Expansionists reward their supporters with campaign contributions and votes and punish their opponents with abusive charges of extremism and racism. Restrictionists tend not to be organized or are too weak to be effective. The public may be skeptical of the wisdom of immigration, but election campaigns are rarely occasions to express themselves on the matter. The normal politics of immigration in the United States is client politics and this produces its expansionary inclination.

THE NEW POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION

Superficially, immigration politics in the U.S. today appear different from the pattern of the last three decades. The public is more hostile than ever and efforts are afoot to tackle legal and illegal immigration at state and federal levels. Immigration has even become at least a tangential issue in the 1996 presidential election. Some observers have concluded that the conventional, client-driven politics of immigration have been replaced by a more raucous version in which voices opposed to immigration have seized the initiative. This is an exaggeration, but the climate has been altered.

Opinion surveys confirm that the public is disturbed by present immigration trends and supports strong measures to change them, but most of the public's anger is directed at illegal, not legal, immigrants and people are most concerned with immigrants who become a drain on public resources. They accept that many immigrants work hard at difficult and poorly paid jobs.⁶

Public disquiet has been answered by numerous policy initiatives. The most important, at least symbolically, was the 1994 campaign in California to deprive illegal immigrants in that state of most publicly-financed benefits. Such a measure could not have passed the California Assembly, but once private citizens succeeded in placing the question on the ballot, Proposition 187 passed overwhelmingly (59 to 41 per cent).⁷ In addition, states with large numbers of illegal immigrants began petitioning the national government for compensation for the state-supported costs associated with such populations, including health, education, and law enforcement expenditures. Receiving little response, five states filed lawsuits in federal court for recovery of costs. The suits have gone nowhere legally, but they conveyed a powerful political message.⁸

The activities of the non-partisan Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR), which had been established pursuant to the 1990 Immigration Act, contributed to widened public discussion. Its recommendations with respect to illegal and legal migration legitimated some restrictionist proposals.⁹ Of particular importance were: the Commission's support of new border control strategies; at least halting steps toward a national system for work verification that might strengthen the employer sanctions system; and a reduction in the annual legal intake of 675,000 by 125,000. Chaired by former Congresswoman Barbara Jordan of Texas, an individual with impeccable liberal credentials, the Commission's proposals promise to have more than the normal clout associated with such temporary bodies.¹⁰

Legislative activity in the Congress reflected the heightened interest outside Washington. The capture of both houses of Congress by the Republicans in the 1994 elections brightened the prospects for immigration reform appreciably. Major immigration bills are in the works. The Immigration in the National Interest Bill, HR 2202 (originally HR 1915), introduced by Representative Lamar Smith, Republican of Texas, would reduce annual legal immigration by about 140,000, mostly at the expense of the family reunion category.¹¹ Senator Alan Simpson, Republican of Wyoming, is sponsoring two bills, one dealing with control of illegal migration and the other focusing on the legal program. The latter would reduce the number of employment-based visas from 140,000 per year to 90,000, eliminate entirely the ability of U.S. citizens to sponsor their adult children or their siblings, and limit the ability of U.S. citizens to bring in their parents unless they are over 65, have over half their children residing lawfully in the United States, and obtain health insurance.

Although they enjoy some bipartisan support, these measures have faced concerted opposition and the House bill (HR 2202), which was introduced first, has been amended in an expansionist direction as it has made its way through the committee stage. Final approval may come during the first six months of 1996. But, whatever the final shape of the law, substantial reforms appear certain.

What accounts for this transformation? A few long-term trends and numerous highly visible events have created space for consideration of immigration reform. The two most important trends have to do with the scale of recent migration and its concentration in particular states. Legal and illegal immigration since the mid-sixties approaches the highest levels in U.S. history. This has especially been true in the last five years since the adoption of the 1990 Immigration Act which boosted legal immigration by one-third. There have also been sharp increases in asylum applications in the U.S. and unabated illegal immigration.¹² The latter accentuated the failure of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act to stem illegal entry.

In addition to questions of scale, a critical structural factor is that the effects of both legal and illegal immigration tend to be disproportionately concentrated in a handful of states. In fiscal year 1991, for example, 79 per cent of the 1.8 million immigrants who entered the country legally settled in just seven of the fifty states. Almost half (40 per cent) went to California, while 12 per cent went to Texas, 10 per cent to New York, eight per cent to Florida, and most of the rest were scattered among Illinois, New Jersey, and Arizona. Illegal migration was also directed primarily at these states, especially California. Normally, this concentration has the effect of defusing the issue and limiting its discussion in the national arena. For most Americans living in areas marginally affected by migrants, the costs of immigration are experienced as diffuse and distant. For reasons I have already discussed, the beneficiaries in the heavily impacted areas have political advantages over the losers and tend to prevail in conflicts over policy. As a result of the huge numbers of migrants entering the country, however, the impact on a few key states became sufficient to alter the political equation both locally and nationally.

California led the way both because of the scale of the migration and because an economic recession exacerbated immigration's consequences. California Governor Pete Wilson won re-election in November 1994 after campaigning for Proposition 187, calling for the introduction of a national identity card, and suggesting that legal immigration should be reduced. He also made immigration a key element in his short-lived campaign for the Republican presidential nomination in 1995. Events in California, a key state in presidential election politics, captured the attention of Washington officialdom.

How strong the tendency toward support of immigration is, even when scale and concentration converge, is illustrated by the case of Texas which is widely seen as relatively at ease with immigration in contrast to California.¹³ Republican Governor George W. Bush, the ex-president's eldest son, opposes a Proposition 187-style movement for Texas (improbable in any case because of the absence of the initiative mechanism in the Texas constitution) and has generally taken moderate positions on immigration issues.

Despite these divergent official reactions, public opinion in the two states is similar. A Los Angeles Times poll in September 1993 showed that 86 per cent of Californians said that illegal immigration into California was either a major or moderate problem, while 47 per cent thought the same about legal immigration. Seventy-three per cent approved using the National Guard (military troops) to assist the Border Patrol in curtailing illegal immigration from Mexico, and a small majority (54 per cent) favored amending the U.S. Constitution to bar automatic birthright citizenship for children of illegal immigrants. Only 39 per cent thought it was a good idea to prohibit illegal immigrants from attending public schools, however, and 74 per cent opposed denying emergency healthcare to illegal immigrants.¹⁴

Asked by the Texas Poll in October 1995 whether they thought Proposition 187 was a good idea for California, 60 per cent of Texans, about the proportion of 'yes' votes in California, agreed that it was. Sixty-one per cent said that it would also be a good thing for Texas. Only 45 per cent supported an English-only rule for instruction in the public schools, however, and 44 per cent supported the passage of an English-only law for the state.¹⁵ These data indicate that residents of California and Texas are about equally upset by illegal migration and skeptical of the benefits of large-scale legal entries, but they do not suggest an undifferentiated anti-immigrant groundswell. The different experiences of the two states also point to the critical impact of economic conditions (the Texas economy has been booming in recent years), and of political entrepreneurship in forcing immigration onto the public agenda.

Apart from the structural trends of scale and concentration, the national political climate has been shaped by particular events and crises. Some of the most important include the flotillas of Haitian and Cuban boatpeople in the summer and fall of 1992, riots in Los Angeles in the summer of 1992 that led to the arrest of large numbers of illegal aliens, the arrest of persons who had slipped through the U.S. visa system for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the running aground of the Golden Venture in Long Island Sound with hundreds of illegal Chinese aboard, and the discovery of a sweatshop in California where dozens of undocumented Thai women were being held in virtual slavery.

CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

Is the U.S. entering a new era of mean-spirited immigration conflict that will overturn the incremental expansionism that has represented normalcy for three decades? Some restrictive measures have already been put in place, especially tougher border control strategies and sterner treatment of asylum-seekers on the high seas. The longstanding policy of granting refugee status to all fleeing Cubans lost its Cold War justification and has formally ended. The flight of Haitian boat-people has been seriously curtailed. These changes should not be dismissed as marginal and the hardships they impose on individuals must be admitted. They scarcely warrant the alarmist attacks they have elicited from immigration advocates, however. Most are reasonable steps toward the more effective enforcement of existing law.

The sort of reforms likely to emerge from Congress will not depart fundamentally from outcomes produced under 'normal' politics. To borrow from the title of the first report of the CIR, their purpose is to 'restore credibility' to a program that is out of control. Even if the most draconian proposals on the table were passed, they would only move U.S. policy back to where it was in 1990 in terms of annual admissions. With respect to rules of selection, some dent may be made in the system of family preferences, especially the ability of citizens and legal permanent residents to petition for the admission of their parents, adult children, and brothers and sisters, though that is far from settled. Family reunion will, in any case, remain the backbone of American immigrant selection.

Legislation is only the beginning of the fight for new policies. Any change in the law is sure to provoke a flurry of litigation that could stymie implementation of at least some provisions. Such litigation has already put Proposition 187 on indefinite hold. The record of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in enforcing previous changes in the law is not encouraging to those hoping to see a more effectively administered system.

Efforts to tighten employer sanctions are not likely to be successful, although an experiment with a national registry for social security numbers to identify those eligible for work was proposed by the CIR and endorsed by President Clinton. Such a registry could be the first step toward a credible national system of work authorization documentation. At the least, the current episode has temporarily derailed a bipartisan drive supported by business and civil rights advocates to repeal employer sanctions.

One ironic effect of the current immigration 'retreat' will be to accelerate the acquisition of citizenship by large numbers of permanent residents who have, for various reasons, chosen not to naturalize. Proposals to strip non-citizen permanent residents of certain state-provided benefits enjoy popular support, as I have noted, but their passage is doubtful and their chances of surviving court challenges near zero. Partly in response to fears generated by such movements, however, record numbers of legal permanent residents are queueing up to apply for citizenship.¹⁶ The INS has launched a citizenship initiative at the federal level and the major immigration states are planning outreach campaigns.

Recent experience follows the pattern common throughout American history of providing breathing space for the assimilation of newcomers after phases of substantial migration. Despite the scale of recent migration, and the fact that it is overwhelmingly of Third World origin, what is most striking is the lassitude and moderation of the American response. Despite some extreme rhetoric, most serious proposals are within the range of democratically acceptable revisions of a generous and recent policy that has never really rested on a popular consensus.

References

¹ Because the Congress sets immigration numbers in law, the intake cannot be adjusted periodically to take into account changing economic conditions as is done in Canada and Australia. Any proposed change is necessarily more controversial because it may be difficult to undo.

² Over three million persons gained legal status under the law for having lived in the U.S. illegally since before 1982 and their family relations are now being legalized as well. Almost 150,000 dependents were admitted between fiscal years 1992 and 1994 (Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook, 1994, Table 2).

³ I explore this general puzzle in 'Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,' International Migration Review, vol. 29, no. 4, 1995, pp. 881-902. Here I apply the general analysis to the American case.

⁴ Reported in the Houston Chronicle, August 29, 1993.

⁵ I follow the analysis of J. Wilson, (ed.) The Politics of Regulation, Harper, New York, 1980.

⁶ In a Newsweek poll taken in August, 1993 a large majority (59 per cent) thought that immigration had been a good thing for the country in the past, but only 29 per cent thought that it was a good thing today. Two-thirds believe that immigrants are more likely today to maintain their national identity than to join the American melting pot. Two-thirds also agree that immigrants take the jobs of U.S. workers and 59 per cent believe that many immigrants wind up on welfare and raise taxes for Americans. At the same time, however, 78 per cent say that immigrants work hard, often taking jobs that Americans don't want. In December 1994, 53 per cent of Americans said they would support a law in their state eliminating education, health, and welfare benefits for illegal immigrants and their children. Slightly more, 56 per cent, favored eliminating all aid to legal immigrants until they had lived in the country for at least five years. Even more striking, 47 per cent said they supported a proposal to stop giving such government assistance as welfare, housing, job training, and income security payments to legal immigrants who are not U.S. citizens (reported in CQ Researcher, February 3, 1995, p. 100).

⁷ The measure prohibited illegal immigrants from receiving state-supported services, except for emergency healthcare, and required state officials to report persons suspected of being in the country illegally.

⁸ Five states brought suit. Three of these, California, Texas, and Florida, have already been dismissed; suits by Arizona and New Jersey are pending.

⁹ United States Commission on Immigration Reform, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility - A Report to Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1994. Additional recommendations were released in June, 1995.

¹⁰ Unfortunately, Jordan died in January, 1996, leaving the Commission temporarily without leadership.

¹¹ For details of this legislation, see Rosemary Jenks, 'Current moves to reform immigration in the United States', People and Place, vol. 3, no. 3, 1995, pp. 1-3.

¹² Total legal immigration was roughly 810,000 in 1992, 880,000 in 1993, and 798,000 in 1994. Asylum applications rose from about 60,000 in 1991 to 150 thousand in both 1993 and 1994 (Immigration and Naturalization Service, Immigration to the United States in Fiscal Year 1994, June, 1995). The Center for Immigration Studies estimates that illegal immigration has been running at roughly 300,000 per year since 1991, with a total illegal population of 5.4 million in 1995 (Center for Migration Studies, Immigration-Related Statistics, 1994, 1995, Washington, D.C.).

¹³ 'Texas: avoiding mistakes made by California', Austin American Statesman, September 14, 1995

¹⁴ Reported in CQ Researcher, September 24, 1995, p. 855

¹⁵ Texas Poll, 1995, reported in the Austin American Statesman, November 4, 1995

16 Almost a million people applied for naturalization in fiscal year (FY) 1995, up from 543,353 in FY 1994 and 522,298 in 1993. It is estimated that there are 2.5 to three million Mexican nationals in the United States who are eligible to apply for citizenship. Half of these are in California, 11 per cent in Texas, and 12 per cent in Florida and Arizona (Migration News, February, 1996).

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