

THE COSMOPOLITAN SOCIAL AGENDA AND THE REFERENDUM ON THE REPUBLIC

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Should Australia become a republic with a head of state elected by a two-thirds majority of Parliament? In November 1999 this question was put to the people in a referendum and lost. The October 1998 Australian Election Study can help us understand this result.

This survey shows that economic class and region were both associated with attitudes to the referendum; better-off, better-educated people in inner-city suburbs were more likely to vote yes and poorer, less well-educated people in the outer suburbs and rural areas were more likely to vote no. Trust in political institutions is also important; the more people trust government and political parties the more likely they were to vote yes. However, another factor has a stronger effect on the vote than either economic class, region or trust, and that is attitudes to the new cosmopolitan social agenda developed in the Hawke and Keating years. This agenda includes closer integration with Asia, support for minority rights, especially Aboriginal rights, and support for multiculturalism and immigration. People who approve of this agenda were more likely to have voted yes than people who do not.

Economic and locational variables can be thought of as one major set of causes of the outcome of the referendum and attitudes to the cosmopolitan agenda as another. There is an overlap between the two sets but this overlap is only partial, and the effect of support for the cosmopolitan agenda is stronger than the effect of economic circumstances or region. The effect of trust is mid-way between the two major sets.

On the 6th of November 1999 the Australian people voted in a referendum to determine whether the constitution should be altered 'to establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a republic with the Queen and the Governor-General being replaced by a president appointed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth Parliament'. The proposition was lost: 55 per cent voted no compared to 45 per cent voting yes.¹ Had the question involved a directly elected head of state the outcome would have been different; the concept of a republic with a directly elected president was quite popular enough to have carried the day. Advocates for the yes case had hoped to attract enough support from direct electionists to win, but they did not.

Why did the referendum fail? Apart from the form in which the question was put, there are a number of possible answers. Some hinge on economic

inequality, others on differences between urban and rural Australia, and others on trust in Government. This article examines these explanations but it also explores another: the effects of the social agenda which accompanied the launch of the current push for a republic and the differences between those who were attracted to that agenda and those who were not.

Most of the analyses of the referendum results in the press have focussed on class and regional differences in the vote. Affluent, inner-city, electorates tended to vote yes, while rural, provincial and out-suburban electorates tended to vote no. (All but two of the 42 electorates where a majority voted yes were metropolitan, 26 of them inner-metropolitan.)² Pre-referendum polling also showed a relatively clear division in voting intention between affluent, well-educated people and the rest.³ But why should the question on the republic have become a

class and regional issue? Perhaps those voters who had borne the rough end of a decade and a half of economic change were irritated with politicians and reformers and distrustful of them. In the eyes of these voters, advocates for the yes case may have appeared as dilettantes who had done well out of the economic changes which had destabilised and diminished the lives of many ordinary Australians. Now this same group was indulging itself with the luxury of a non-essential constitutional change, while the problems which struck middle Australia as more pressing — such as jobs and declining services — were left unsolved.

NEW-CLASS COSMOPOLITANS AND THE BACKGROUND TO THE REFERENDUM

An explanation based on economic factors of this kind looks plausible but the story may run deeper. The theory explored in this article is that many no-voters perceived the referendum not just as a superficial diversion for the rich, but as an affront to the way in which they felt about their identity as Australians. Indeed some sharp words from this perspective were directed towards the yes-case proponents, a group described as a 'left-liberal' elite who had never cared much for the old Australia they were seeking to transform. As Australia's leading poet, Les Murray, put it five days before the vote:

It's interesting that advertising for the yes option has muted all the rancorous divisiveness the elites have forced on us over late decades. No more crude racist Anglo-Australians versus immaculate non-British migrants, for example. If we were to go on being treated as all good Aussies together even after a yes victory, I'd vote yes. But somehow I and probably millions of others don't believe the

niceness would last. Our elites have never liked us as we are.⁴

Or as one letter to the editor put it:

There is only one thing that can be guaranteed if the 'no' vote wins; the republican elite who have been telling us Australians are a proud, independent, intelligent, forward-looking people will suddenly turn around and describe us [as] weak, cloying, stupid and reactionary.

They don't care about ordinary Australians like me. They seek to flatter us now, but the hidden enmity will break forth in a torrent from its temporary dam once their model is defeated.⁵

Some of the reactions after the event seem to have proved him right. One disappointed yes-supporter wrote:

[O]n Sunday [after the vote], my vision of Australia became scarier. I now see a clever country dumbed down by malicious bullshit and ignorance; I see negativity and hopelessness; I see a country of gutless, unimaginative copies; I see a country still drooling over images of Lady Di, the Queen Mum and the Queen's corgies...⁶

And another:

Shame Australia, shame. If ever Australians exhibited a cultural cringe they do so now. We must now be the laughing stock of the world. How so many Australians can have swallowed the scare-mongering and populist drivel which was served up by the proponents of the 'no' case is beyond me, but I guess the ill-informed ignorance of the 'One Nation syndrome' still lurks close below the surface...⁷

These exchanges do support Murray's thesis, but it is difficult to see some prominent 'yes' supporters, such as the Federal treasurer, Peter Costello, as part of a *left-liberal*. Moreover 17 electorates with Liberal members voted yes.⁸ The Prime Minister's own electorate of Bennelong which encompasses an affluent area in inner metropolitan Sydney is a case in

point. Despite John Howard's support for the no case, 55 per cent of his constituents voted yes. Why should a *left-liberal* ideology appeal to voters of this kind?

This is where the question of attitudes to the Australian identity can help. The importance of this factor is implicit in Murray's thesis but it needs to be spelt out. People might vote for the republic not just because they were relaxed, comfortable and well informed, but because they were attracted to the image of Australia and its place in the world which they felt to be implicit in the yes case. There are at least two key dimensions in explaining the results of the vote in the referendum — the economic and the cultural — and they do not always overlap. The cultural beliefs which may have attracted many Liberal voters to the yes case are no more left than they are right; they are cosmopolitan.

During the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments (1983 to 1996) Australia experienced dramatic structural changes which deregulated the financial system and exposed the economy to global markets in a revolutionary fashion. These changes brought wealth to some and insecurity to many. But they were not a matter of economics alone; they were accompanied by a social and cultural agenda. This agenda had a longer history, dating back to the Whitlam and Fraser Governments, but it came to its full flowering in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It had a number of aspects: high immigration, multiculturalism, enthusiasm for integrating Australia into Asia, and support for equal-opportunity legislation and minority rights, particularly for Aboriginal rights. Though Paul Keating cut the immigration intake soon after he achieved Government,⁹ he made his own additions to the agenda. These included support for the arts and for the new idea

that it was time for Australia to become a republic, an idea which he first mooted in 1992.¹⁰

As I argue in *The Great Divide*, this social and cultural agenda cannot be understood in terms of conventional left-versus-right politics. Aspects of it, such as high immigration and closer links with Asia, do appeal to the business community while others, such as support for minority rights do appeal to some elements on the left. But the agenda is not part of the old political struggle between capital and labour. It belongs to a new struggle between sections of the new class of professionals (and managers) and the remnants of the old British-oriented establishment together with the majority of Australians who are not new class, particularly the socially conservative working and lower-middle class. Most new-class cosmopolitans believe in the new social and cultural agenda but they also use the ideas involved to put social distance between themselves and non-believers. People who are not members of the new class (together with those who are, but who do not share the cosmopolitan agenda) are much more numerous but they tend to be less influential.

The core of the non-new-class category is the socially conservative parochials, people who value their image of Australia as a decent nation with a proud history and who look to their country to provide security and protection.¹¹ (My definition of the new class comes from the American sociologist Alvin Gouldner¹² and is based on education and intellectual capital. But in practical terms it is not very far removed from the group which Paul Kelly defines as new class, 'a coalition of white-collar professionals — teachers, social workers, university lecturers, journalists, reformist lawyers, environmentalists, civil servants and

union officials', together with some of his 'opinion-making elite in the media, business and banks'.¹³

Most aspects of the program for economic change were not put to the people in any Federal election, and the same was true of most aspects of the cosmopolitan social agenda. The changes were imposed by the few not chosen by the many. But despite this, a number of aspects of the social agenda were prominent in Keating's last, and unsuccessful, election campaign in 1996, particularly his passionate advocacy of Aboriginal rights, the theme of integrating Australia into Asia, and the republic.¹⁴ In terms of the old economically based politics of free markets versus state welfare and state regulation there is nothing very left-wing about this agenda. It has just as much appeal to the new-class cosmopolitans who vote Liberal as it does to those who vote Labor (and very little appeal to the traditional, parochial, Labor voters who deserted Keating for the Liberals).

But given the attraction of patriotism for the mainstream, shouldn't the idea of a republic have appealed to them? It depends on the kind of republic envisaged and the way in which it is presented. Alan Atkinson wrote in 1993 that the Keating republic was a curiously bloodless affair. Don Watson, Keating's speechwriter, had described his vision of Australia as 'the world's first post-modern republic', a republic marked not by exalting the nation but by valuing 'difference rather than uniformity'. Atkinson adds that this vision was part of a broader movement involving the blurring of national boundaries and the abdication of sovereignty over the country's resources and over the welfare of its people. Well before the actual question put to the nation had been formed, Atkinson judged that the idea of a 'post-modern' republic

had little popular appeal.¹⁵ He also pointed out its role in the contest for power and influence between the old establishment and the new class (whom he calls the 'new establishment').¹⁶

The yes campaign did not follow Atkinson's script to the letter, but it made few appeals to national symbols. It dwelt more on its proponents' image of a better, 'more adult', future for the country than on any feeling of pride in Australia's unique heritage and achievements. A patriot could well have taken offence at the implication that Australia was not a 'real' nation already.

Affluence and inner-city location are associated with the yes vote, but why? And why should poorer voters living in the outer suburbs and the country have rejected the republic? The referendum may have carried with it the flavour of its origins as part of a broader social agenda, an agenda which sought to continue re-making Australia in a form more suited to the tastes of cosmopolitans, and this may have contributed to its failure.

THE 1998 AUSTRALIAN ELECTION STUDY

The 1998 Australian Election Study (AES) provides evidence which allows us both to explore the relationship between the vote on the referendum and economic inequality, and to test the theory that there is a link between this vote and attitudes to the cosmopolitans' preferred image of Australia.

The AES consists of an in-depth questionnaire sent to a random sample of voters by Clive Bean, David Gow and Ian McAllister after the Federal election in October 1998.¹⁷ (These scholars bear no responsibility for my analysis and interpretation of their data.) Among its many questions the AES contained two on attitudes to the republic. These can be

combined so that the sample is divided into three groups: those who actively favour a republic in which the head of state is elected by parliament, those who actively favour a republic with a head of state directly elected by voters (and who were therefore likely to be undecided about the November referendum question), and those who favour retaining the status quo. (The two questions were: 'Do you think that Australia should become a republic with an Australian head of state, or should the Queen be retained as head of state?' and 'If Australia becomes a republic with an Australian head of state, should the head of state be elected by the voters or elected by Parliament?') The combination produces a variable here labelled 'Attitude to the referendum'. It has three categories:

- Favours a republic with election of the head of state by Parliament (votes yes);
- Favours a republic with direct election of the head of state (undecided);
- Favours retention of the monarchy and the status quo (votes no).

This variable has been cross-classified with a number of other questions, two on trust in government and political parties, four tapping various aspects of the respondent's economic situation (subjective assessment of social class, highest educational qualification, income, and region) and six on aspects of the cosmopolitan social agenda. Most of the data have been analysed in such a way as to highlight the extremes, for example, showing those who trust government most compared with those who distrust it most. But this approach is modified if it would lead to fewer than 100 respondents in the sub-category concerned. For example, as far as trust in government is concerned, only 15 respondents thought that the government was 'entirely run for the benefit of all the people' so they have

been combined with the 199 who thought it was 'mostly run for the benefit of all the people'. And as far as subjective class is concerned, only 23 respondents said that they were 'upper class', so they have been combined with the 769 who said that they were 'middle class'. This variable therefore, by default, separates the sample not into extremes but into two major groups.¹⁸

Analysis of respondents by income and education was organised so as to include all the respondents (except, of course, those who did not answer those particular questions), splitting the sample into two major groups. This permits further analysis of the effects of the social agenda by providing a basis for controlling for economic class.

Table 1 shows that a republic with direct election of the head of state is the most popular of the three alternatives for the sample as a whole, but that the status quo was rather more popular than the republican model which was actually put to the vote. The table is arranged into three panels; the first sets out attitudes to the republic by political and economic variables — trust, economic circumstances, and region. The second panel shows attitudes to the republic by the six questions which tap aspects of the cosmopolitan social agenda. The third panel is discussed below.

The distribution of responses in Table 1 in the various sub-categories of the sample shows that the proportion opting for direct election is the most stable, the proportion favouring a republic with election of the head of state by Parliament varies more widely, while the proportion favouring the status quo varies the most widely of all.¹⁹

Which variables produce the most difference? If we simply concentrate on the effect of the political and economic

Table 1: Attitude to the referendum by trust in Government, economic circumstances, region, and attitudes to the cosmopolitan social agenda

| | Election by parlia- ment (yes) | Direct election (undecided) | Monarchist/ status quo (no) | Total % | No. |
|--|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Total sample | 15 | 51 | 21 | 100 | 1,829 |
| Political and economic questions | | | | | |
| <i>Trust</i> | | | | | |
| Would you say that government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? | | | | | |
| Mostly or entirely run for the benefit of all | 25 | 39 | 36 | 100 | 214 |
| Entirely run for the big interests | 7 | 55 | 37 | 100 | 267 |
| Some people say that political parties in Australia care what ordinary people think. Others say that [they] don't care... Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5? | | | | | |
| They care (1 & 2) | 19 | 45 | 36 | 100 | 366 |
| They don't care (5) | 8 | 52 | 40 | 100 | 345 |
| <i>Economic circumstances</i> | | | | | |
| What is your highest qualification? | | | | | |
| Graduate | 27 | 52 | 21 | 100 | 321 |
| Non-graduate | 13 | 51 | 36 | 100 | 1,397 |
| Which social class would you say you belong to? | | | | | |
| Upper or middle class | 21 | 48 | 31 | 100 | 792 |
| Working class | 9 | 54 | 38 | 100 | 797 |
| What is the gross annual income ... for you and your family living with you from all sources? | | | | | |
| \$50,001 plus | 21 | 54 | 25 | 100 | 542 |
| Less than \$50,001 | 12 | 50 | 38 | 100 | 1,119 |
| <i>Region</i> | | | | | |
| Inner metropolitan | 19 | 56 | 26 | 100 | 502 |
| Rural | 11 | 47 | 43 | 100 | 557 |
| Social questions | | | | | |
| Aboriginal land rights [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone nearly far enough | 33 | 53 | 14 | 100 | 108 |
| Gone much too far | 8 | 43 | 48 | 100 | 453 |
| Building closer relations with Asia [has] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 26 | 54 | 20 | 100 | 434 |
| Gone much too far | 7 | 43 | 49 | 100 | 152 |
| Government help for Aborigines [has] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 28 | 55 | 16 | 100 | 338 |
| Gone much too far | 10 | 46 | 44 | 100 | 423 |
| Equal opportunities for migrants [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 25 | 60 | 15 | 100 | 225 |
| Gone much too far | 8 | 49 | 43 | 100 | 224 |
| Immigrants take jobs away from people who are born in Australia | | | | | |
| Strongly disagree | 21 | 58 | 21 | 100 | 131 |
| Strongly agree | 5 | 47 | 47 | 100 | 230 |
| People who come to live in Australia should try harder to be more like other Australians | | | | | |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 22 | 55 | 23 | 100 | 415 |
| Strongly agree | 7 | 49 | 44 | 100 | 316 |
| Land rights—whole sample | | | | | |
| Aboriginal land rights [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough and not gone nearly far enough | 26 | 57 | 17 | 100 | 366 |
| Gone much too far, gone too far, and about right | 12 | 50 | 39 | 100 | 1,387 |
| About right, not gone far enough, and not gone nearly far enough | | | | | |
| Gone too far and gone much too far | 20 | 55 | 25 | 100 | 791 |
| Gone too far and gone much too far | 10 | 48 | 42 | 100 | 962 |

variables in the first panel on the yes vote, trust in government has the strongest effect. People who trust government to take care of the people's interests are more than three times as likely to have voted yes in the November referendum than those who do not. Education is the next strongest. Graduates are just over twice as likely to have voted yes than non-graduates. Education is followed by subjective social class, then trust in political parties, and then income. Region is important, but not as important as the other five variables. Residents of inner metropolitan areas are just over 1.7 times more likely to vote yes than people in rural areas. However, the first three questions tapping aspects of the cosmopolitan social agenda in the second panel have a stronger effect on the yes vote than any in the first panel. For example, people who think Aboriginal land rights have not gone nearly far enough are more than four times as likely to vote yes than people who think they have gone much too far. Those who think land rights have gone much too far are also nearly three and half times more likely to vote no. Indeed all of the social questions have a stronger effect on the no vote than do any in the first panel.

But perhaps Table 1 creates an unfair set of comparisons by aiming for the extreme values on the social questions while taking a more inclusive approach on three of the economic questions (subjective social class, income and education)? The third panel of the table re-analyses the question on attitudes to Aboriginal land rights in such a way as to show all of the responses.²⁰ In the first instance it combines the central group of 425 people who think that the current extent of Aboriginal land rights is 'about right' with those who feel that land rights have gone too far or much too far. (This

approach is taken on the grounds that the 'about right' group would not want any further extension of land rights.) In this version of the inclusive form the people who favour an extension of land rights are more than twice as likely to vote yes as those who do not, while people who do not want an extension of land rights are more than twice as likely to vote no. The variable still has a stronger effect on the yes vote than any of the variables in the first panel, except trust in government, and its effect on the no vote is still much stronger than any of the variables in the first panel.

But this assignment of the 'about right' group may be deemed too favourable to the social agenda theory, consequently the second set of data in the third panel assigns them to the category which wants more land rights. Even if the data are presented in this fashion, the group which 'wants more' land rights is still twice as likely to vote yes than the group which is opposed. The land-rights variable still has a stronger effect on the yes vote than income or region, and a much stronger effect on the no vote than any of the first-panel variables.

THE COSMOPOLITAN AGENDA, ECONOMIC FACTORS, AND ATTITUDES TO THE REPUBLIC

A preliminary account of these findings was reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald* the weekend after the referendum. This attracted some criticism, especially from Rod Cameron, an experienced pollster who had worked for the yes campaign. Cameron claimed that the results were just a statistical artefact. 'Absolute twaddle. ... Why didn't she link it [the vote in the referendum] to the price of eggs or petrol? ... Of course it's related to attitudes to immigration and Aborigines — but it's a simple

correlation, that these are things country and poorer people have more problems with. ... It's a statistical artefact'.²¹

Table 1 suggests that the attitudes to the cosmopolitan agenda analysed in the second panel are unlikely to be simply an artefact of the respondents' economic

position analysed in the first panel because, when we look at the effects on the vote by the cosmopolitan-agenda questions, the results are stronger than the effects of the economic variables. But Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that they are not such an artefact because these tables

Table 2: Attitude to the referendum by attitudes to the cosmopolitan social agenda, controlling for annual income

| Social questions by annual income | Election by parliament | Direct election | Monarchist/s tatus quo | Total % | No. |
|--|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|---------|-----|
| People from families on \$50,001 plus (N = 542) | | | | | |
| Aboriginal land rights [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or nearly far enough | 35 | 55 | 9 | 100 | 119 |
| Gone much too far | 12 | 46 | 41 | 100 | 114 |
| Building closer relations with Asia [has] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 35 | 51 | 14 | 100 | 173 |
| Gone too far or much too far | 8 | 58 | 34 | 100 | 83 |
| Government help for Aborigines [has] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 39 | 55 | 6 | 100 | 115 |
| Gone much too far | 15 | 49 | 37 | 100 | 117 |
| Equal opportunities for migrants [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 33 | 56 | 11 | 100 | 80 |
| Gone much too far | 13 | 56 | 31 | 100 | 160 |
| Immigrants take jobs away from people who are born in Australia | | | | | |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 28 | 54 | 18 | 100 | 276 |
| Agree and strongly agree | 8 | 56 | 35 | 100 | 142 |
| People who come to live in Australia should try harder to be more like other Australians | | | | | |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 26 | 59 | 15 | 100 | 160 |
| Agree and strongly agree | 16 | 53 | 31 | 100 | 225 |
| People from families on less than \$50,001 (N = 1,119) | | | | | |
| Aboriginal land rights [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or nearly far enough | 21 | 56 | 23 | 100 | 219 |
| Gone much too far | 6 | 44 | 50 | 100 | 300 |
| Building closer relations with Asia [has] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 19 | 56 | 26 | 100 | 227 |
| Gone too far or much too far | 6 | 44 | 50 | 100 | 242 |
| Government help for Aborigines [has] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 22 | 54 | 23 | 100 | 197 |
| Gone much too far | 7 | 45 | 48 | 100 | 274 |
| Equal opportunities for migrants [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or not gone nearly far enough | 21 | 62 | 17 | 100 | 123 |
| Gone much too far | 5 | 49 | 47 | 100 | 373 |
| Immigrants take jobs away from people who are born in Australia | | | | | |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 20 | 54 | 26 | 100 | 353 |
| Agree and strongly agree | 7 | 48 | 45 | 100 | 456 |
| People who come to live in Australia should try harder to be more like other Australians | | | | | |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 19 | 52 | 29 | 100 | 228 |
| Agree and strongly agree | 9 | 48 | 43 | 100 | 607 |

control for the respondents' economic circumstances — measured in the first instance by annual income and in the second by education. (Table 3 only includes three social questions because the numbers in the categories in the other three questions were well below 100 as far as graduates were concerned.)

Tables 2 and 3 show that the cosmopolitan agenda does have an effect on attitudes to the referendum independent of economic circumstances. More affluent, better-educated people are more likely to support the cosmopolitan agenda but not all of them do so. Less affluent, less well-educated people are more likely to reject it, but some of them do not. And independent of economic class, a favourable attitude to the social agenda is associated with the yes vote while opposition to it is associated with the no vote.

CONCLUSION

People's economic circumstances are associated with their vote on the referendum but so are their attitudes to the cosmopolitan social agenda, and attitudes to the cosmopolitan agenda are not an artefact of people's economic circumstances. The two sets of factors do overlap to an extent but this extent has limits; attitudes to the cosmopolitan agenda work with the economic variables but they also affect both the yes and the no vote in a manner that is independent of the respondents' economic situation. It is also the case that attitudes to the cosmopolitan agenda have a stronger effect on both the yes and the no vote than economic circumstances.

This finding cannot, however, in itself explain the referendum result. The outcome depended very much on the choices made by the large proportion of Australians who favoured the direct-

Table 3: Attitude to the referendum by attitudes to the cosmopolitan social agenda, controlling for education

| Social questions by highest qualification | Election by parliament | Direct election | Monarchist/ status quo | Total % | No. |
|--|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|---------|-------|
| Graduates (N =321) | | | | | |
| Aboriginal land rights [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or nearly far enough | 41 | 51 | 8 | 100 | 114 |
| Gone too far and gone much too far | 15 | 55 | 30 | 100 | 106 |
| Building closer relations with Asia [has] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough, not gone nearly far enough and about right | 34 | 52 | 13 | 100 | 128 |
| Gone too far or much too far | 23 | 51 | 26 | 100 | 187 |
| People who come to live in Australia should try harder to be more like other Australians | | | | | |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 31 | 55 | 15 | 100 | 117 |
| Agree and strongly agree | 21 | 48 | 31 | 100 | 97 |
| Non-graduates (N =1,397) | | | | | |
| Aboriginal land rights [have] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough or nearly far enough | 21 | 58 | 21 | 100 | 230 |
| Gone too far and gone much too far | 10 | 47 | 43 | 100 | 804 |
| Building closer relations with Asia [has] | | | | | |
| Not gone far enough, not gone nearly far enough and about right | 23 | 55 | 22 | 100 | 292 |
| Gone too far or much too far | 10 | 50 | 40 | 100 | 1,057 |
| People who come to live in Australia should try harder to be more like other Australians | | | | | |
| Disagree and strongly disagree | 19 | 54 | 27 | 100 | 284 |
| Agree and strongly agree | 11 | 49 | 40 | 100 | 772 |

election model. The proportions supporting this model do not vary as sharply with the variables analysed here as do the proportions clearly supporting either the yes or no case. The present study can shed little light on how the direct-electionists were likely to vote, but it is possible to speculate.

If direct-electionists cared about the republic we would expect them to swallow their distaste of the particular model on offer and to vote yes. The results on November 6th show that many of them must have done so. However, no-case advocates wooed them with the idea that, if they voted no to *this* republic, they would get a chance to vote yes to a direct-election republic later. People who distrust government are likely to have been open to this idea. Reasons for their distrust may well include lack of consultation from their elected representatives over the economic, demographic and cultural changes which have been imposed on Australia during the last 15 years.

References

- ¹ Australian Electoral Commission web site, <http://referendum.aec.gov.au> (accessed 28/11/1999)
- ² Calculated from data at *ibid.* together with information on electorates from The Parliament Stack (1996) produced by the Parliamentary Education Office.
- ³ See Rod Cameron's polling data reported in M. Steketee, 'Going, going, gone', *The Australian*, 13-14 November 1999, p. 2.
- ⁴ L. Murray, 'Beware power grab by left-liberal elite', *The Australian*, 1 November 1999, p. 7
- ⁵ P. Phelps, Letter to the editor; one of 10 under the heading: 'After vote, Australia will remain divided', *The Australian*, 5 November 1999, p. 14
- ⁶ M. Barker, Letter to the editor; one of seven under the general heading of: 'Political death of the Prime Minister', *The Australian*, 8 November 1999, p. 14
- ⁷ R. Hawcroft, *ibid.*
- ⁸ Calculated with data from <http://referendum.aec.gov.au> and <http://election.aec.gov.au>

- ⁹ Keating succeeded Hawke in December 1991. The planned intake of visaed immigrants fell from 110,000 for 1991-92 to 80,000 for 1992-93. After the 1993 election, when Senator Bolkus became Minister for Immigration, the numbers rose again, to 96,000 in 1995-96. See K. Betts, *The Great Divide: Immigration Politics in Australia*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 1999, p. 342.
- ¹⁰ P. Kelly, *The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p. 12
- ¹¹ See Betts, *op. cit.*
- ¹² A. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, Seabury Press, New York, 1979
- ¹³ Kelly, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 330. Kelly describes the politically aware, tertiary-educated elite as 'the most influential force in Australian society in the post-1960s', p. 20.
- ¹⁴ See P. Williams, *The Victory*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1997, pp. 96, 171-174, 212, 213-4, 217, 265, 330.
- ¹⁵ A. Atkinson, *The Muddle-Headed Republic*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1993, pp. 100-101
- ¹⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 122-124.
- ¹⁷ Clive Bean et al., Australian Election Study (AES), 1998 [computer file], Canberra, Social Science Data Archives, The Australian National University, 1998. The AES is the fifth in a series of surveys designed to coincide with Australian Federal elections. It is based on a random national sample of Australian voters, 3502 of whom were sent a detailed questionnaire to complete after the October 1998 election. Of these 1897 questionnaires were returned (giving a response rate of 57.68%). This response rate is biased toward more highly-educated people; 17.6 per cent of the respondents had university degrees compared to just over 10 per cent of the population aged 15 plus at the 1996 Census. The analysis in the present paper is restricted to the 1,829 people who answered the two questions on the republic.
- ¹⁸ All of the sample are included in the subjective social class variable except for those who said they had no social class (171) or who did not answer the question (69).
- ¹⁹ The proportions favouring direct election range from 39 to 60 per cent, with four fifths of the values between 43 and 56 per cent; those favouring a republic with election of the head of state by Parliament range from five to 33 per cent, with four fifths of the values between seven and 27 per cent; and those favouring the status quo range from 14 to 49 per cent, with four fifths of the values between 16 and 47 per cent.
- ²⁰ It excludes only the 76 people who did not answer the question on land rights.
- ²¹ Quoted in D. Snow, 'When no means yes', *Sydney Morning Herald*, Sydney, 13-14 November 1999, p. 40.

